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The Revival of Job Creation Programs in the
1970s: Lessons for the 1980s
Vernon M. Briggst Jr.
Cornell University
During the 1970st direct job creation was revived as a prominent in-
strument of national employment policy. Interest in this policy tack had
been virtually dormant since the pioneering efforts of the 1930s. Relative
to its chief policy rival--tax cutting, public service employment (PSE) was
touted as having the distinct advantages of working quicker; accomplishing
more; being capable of precise participant targeting; and being cheaper in
1its costs to the federal treasury. Indeed, as the stagflation of the 1970s
revealed itself to be more than a passing aberrationt PSE was seen as being
not only the best policy choice but, rather, as being possibly the only
realistic policy alternative that could reduce unemployment without exac-
2
erbating latent inflationary pressures.
By late 1981, howevert the PSE era had ended. PSE had become the object
of political" scorn. The Reagan Administration, with the endorsemcnt of
Congress, not only eliminated all funding for PSE as of October 1, 1981 but
it had also enacted the largest tax reduction program in the nation's history.
Thust PSE enrollments over the decade had started from zero in mid-1971; had
peaked ~t 755,000 participants in April 1978; and had returned to zero by
Fall 1981.
FortunatelYt the progress of PSE was carefully followed by a number of
2independent research studies. These studies have, collectively, examined
the key facets of the PSE programs. They were based on field work and were
conducted over all or part of the lifetime of the various PSE initiatives.
The major research sources consist of two comprehensive national series
of studies--the Brookings:Princeton (B-P) studies and the National Research
Council (NRC) of the National Academy of Science studies; a specific study
of PSE in the rural South--the Cornell-Mississippi (C-M) study; and a study
of the long term effects of PSE on program participants in one specific
urban labor market--the Johns Hopkins (JH) study of the Baltimore SMSA.3
In addition, the findings of the Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey
(CLMS) on participant impacts for the early PSE years (up to 1976) became
available in 1981.4 Hence, there is now a rich repository of wisdom about
the PSE era from which qualitative conclusions~-not theoretical speculation--
can be drawn.
A Brief Policy Overview
The revival of public sector job creation began as a temporary measure
with the Emergency Employment Act of 1971 (EEA). It became an established
part of the nation's economic policy when the Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act of 1973 (CETA) was enacted. Between July 1, 1974 (when CETA
became effective) and October 1978, (when CETA was reauthorized but with sub-
stantial amendments) the CETA legislation actually specified five more dis-
tinctly different PSE programs--each with its own eligibility standards and
.unique operational features. It is not necessary at this juncture to spell
out the details of- each of these ventures. Suffice to say that between 1971
a~d 1976, the PSE programs functioned in a countercyclical capacity; from 1976
to 1978 they served both countercyclical and counterstructural roles; and
from 1978 to 1981 they were essentially counterstructural programs. Ry
3October 1, 1981, funding had been eliminated and the PSE decade was over.
The Positive Side
Of all the issues surrounding PSE policy evolution, none was more nagging
than concern over whether PSE could actually create net new jobs. There were
fears that federal funds would merely displace local funds that would have
otherwise been spent to maintain of increase employment levels. Using various
econometric models,. a body of circumstantial (Le., simulation) evidence was
accumulated that said that substantial displacement could be expected (some
projected a rate as high as 100%). Even though other econometricans responded
by showing how only slight changes in model specifications of these early
studies could considerably reduce the expected displacement effect, it fell
upon field research to reconcile these extreme differences in theoretical
e~pectations. These field studies consistantly found that during the counter-
cyclical phase, the displacement rates were very low relative to what had
been predicted. The B-P study found that the displacement effect varied on
the basis of several criteria but that the overall effect was only about 22
percent. For instance. displacement was higher (31 percent) for large cities
which were financially distressed but was lower (11 percent) for other large
cities which were not so afflicted. The NRC study found an overall displacement
rate of about 35 percent while the C-M study placed the rate at bL. "'een 25
to 30 percent. All of the studies agree that as PSE was converted. into a
counterstructural program--with specified short term projects, mandated low
wage rates, limited enrollment periods, and increased use of job sites sponsored
by non-profit organizations rather than regular government agencies--the dis-
placement rates declined even further. Thus, substantial net employment gains
were achieved by the PSE programs over the decade.
4Likewise, the studies document that countercyclical PSE did have the
desired fiscal effect~ The money was spent quickly by most local program
sponsors. Little of the available funds were idle at any time. Most prime
sponsors were both willing and able to meet specified program enrollment
levels within short time frames. Some, of course, bad to be prodded by the
Department of Labor's policy of "use it or lose it". N~vertheless, the
results were unequivocal: enrollment and spending targets were usually met.
As for the crucial issue of the usefulness of the value of the produced
services, the B-P study noted that during the countercyclical phase of the
program that a "bargain" had been struck. The local governments would be
willing to employ some persons who might not meet their normal qualifications
if the work of PSE workers in general was useful. This "bargain" held at
least until FY 1979. During this period, the quality of the services performed
by PSE workers was consistently found to be at least equal to that of regular
public employees in the same occupations. The tendency of urban prime sponsors
was to employ PSE workers to expand existing types of services or to maintain
previous levels of public services in localities in fiscal distress. In rural
areas, according to the C-M study, the tendency was to add "new" services to.
rural communities but, the "new" services were typically of a nature that
they would be considered common in the urban sector (e.g., emergency services,
police dispatchers, teacher aids, etc.). Thus, the countercyclicaJ PSE pro-
gram often enhanced the quality of rural life. As PSE was converted intu a
counterstructural program, however, the types of jobs and the characteristics
of the participants changed dramatically in urban areas. In rural areas, the
jobs changed but the characteristics of the participants did not vary as much.
As a counterstructural program, PSE jobs became more temporary and un-
skilled in nature. The job sites increasingly shifted to non-profit private
5.organizations. As a result, the terms of the original "bargain" were broken.
Still, the studies show that while these jobs may not have been as politically
attractive, they were still socially useful (e.g., weatherization, senior
citizen care, conservation, repairs, etc.).
Despite differences in measurement standards, the studies show that PSE
participants sustained significant post-program gains relative to preprogram
wages and/or employment status. For instance,the JH study found that real
wages were 16 percent higher for PSE participants in their first job after
completing PSE enrollment compared to their last pre-PSE job; the C-M study,
using the same comparison, found a $.25 an hour average money wage improvement.
The only study that used a control group, the CLMSdata, found a $250 higher
average annual post-program income gain for PSE participants over the control
group. Both the C-M and the CLMS data found strongly positive correlations
between the length of PSE enrollment and higher hourly wages and incomes in
post-program employment (e.g., in C-M, the hourly wage gain was $1.48 for
those in PSE for over 52 weeks; in CLMS, the annual income gain was $650 for
40 weeks or more). As would be expected, the absolute wage and income gains
were the greatest for the persons who had the lowest pre-PSE wages and incomes
(i.e., the most economically disadvantaged).
The studies that calculated a transition employment rate for persons
who found jobs immediately after completing PSE set the rates in the high
, 30 percent to high 40 percent range. The JH study--the only one to study
of the long term post-PSE employment experiences--found that the post-program
employment rate increased dramatically over time. Specifically, the JH study
found a 48 percent immediate transition rate for PSE participants when they
left the PSE program but, one month later, the percentage was 59 percent;
six months later it was 66 percent; one year later it was 70 percent; and
6for three to five years later it ranged from 74 to 80 percent. Hence, the
JH study concluded that the standard short term indicators of PSE program
impacts "severly understate" both the wage and employment effects of PSE
participation. Given the high unemployment rates and the often low income
status of the typical pre-PSE participant, the post-program impacts indicate
that the PSE experience was very beneficial to many if not most of its
participants.
During the countercyclical phase, PSE funds were used successfully to
leverage access for minorities in a number of urban and rural labor markets
to higher job classifications in the public sector. In the rural South, PSE
jobs were especially useful in gaining initial access to public jobs in areas
where these jobs are highly prized and where blacks had been historically
excluded. During the pre-FY 1979 period, it was also a notable accomplishment
of PSE nationwide that many minority PSE workers were able to transition
directly from PSE jobs into permanent public jobs as vacancies occurred.
As the program shifted to a counterstructural program, minority participation
increased even more but the ability to transition directly into public sector
jobs diminished substantially. Still, it is important to credit PSE with
an ability to alter the racial composition of public employment patterns
during a period in the nation's history when such changes in economic op-
portunity were essential.
The Negative Side
The era of the PSE programs was not without its problems. It is impor-
tant, however, to distinguish between difficulties that were the result of
burdens imposed on PSE that would hamper--even cripple--the effectiveness
of any type of human resource development program from problems that were
inherent in the PSE concept itself.
7Looking first at these externally imposed encumbrances, it is unrealistic
to think that any program format could be substantially changed as often as
it was for PSE and not cause extensive administrative difficulties. Com-
pounding the drastic programmatic shifts was the fact that they occurred
during the start .up-years of the local prime sponsor system itself. The
process of building an institutional capacity to deliver local human resource
programs (which include numerous other activities besides PSE) is a fragile
process. Frequent and extensive program changes in PSE did much to undermine
the ability of local prime sponsors to build a credible foundation during
these critical formative years. Vacillations in PSE funding levels as well
as delays in making funds available by Congress added to the administrative
difficulties. In mid-1977, prime sponsors had to contend with the numerous
programmatic changes that occurred in late 1976 when the shift of PSE to a
counterstructural PSE focus began. They also had to implement the massive
PSE enrollment "build-up" of countercyclical PSE that was the cornerstone
of the Carter Administration's economic stimulus program. Simultaneous with
all of this, the Youth Employment and Demonstration Project Act (YEDPA) was
.also enacted in the Spring of 1977. YEDPA was the most complicated and multi-
faceted human resource program to have been created by Congress up until
that time. Simply put, the administrative capacity of the local prime sponsor
system was overtaxed by the combined obligations of all of these h~ppenings.
A price was paid. Planning, monitoring, and evaluation of PSE program
performance were luxuries that could only be perfunctorily performed. With-
out these functions, it was not long before incidents of waste, fraud, or
mismanagement provided plentiful fodder for local politicians and news media
to exploit. All of CETA--but PSE in particular--fell victim to a debilitative
image from which it has yet to escape. The extensive restrictions imposed on
8PSE in late 1978 were the Congressional capstone to this traumatic episode.
Even though the actual incidents of proven mismanagement of PSE funds
were grossly exaggerated, there were a sufficient number of legitimate wrong-
doings to.undermine the public's perception of what PSE sought to accomplish.
Because the local prime sponsors were themselves governmental entities, they
could not be oblivious to changes in the political winds. The PSE program
was vulnerable to criticism. Without the ability to plan, to monitor and
to evaluate, even the best of administrators cannot avoid errors in judgement or
detect actions of malice by some local opportunitists. Local criticism served
to undermine the morale of many staff workers and contributed to high turn
over rates of administrators and staff workers as noted in the studies.
Such losses in expertise hindered program efficiency. If PSE should again
become part of the nation's employment strategy, the ability to plan--which
includes .stability in program design and funding by Congress--as well as to
monitor and to evaluate on-going program activities must be feasible in
fact and not just be fictional statutory language.
The studies that continued past FY 1979 confirm that, as PSE became
counterstructural, the more restrictive targeting came at a cost of diminished
short run job transition. (Unfortunately the JH study of long term impacts
did not include anyone who entered the PSE program after March, 1978). The
job sites were increasingly shifted to private non-profit organizations.
These community based organizations (CBOs) typically had limited budgets and
were usually unable to absorb PSE workers when their PSE eligibility ended.
The types of jobs provided by CBOs were less likely to provide experience
that was directly transferable to either the public or the private-for profit
sector. The regular public agencies that provided better job sites were
largely precluded from doing so by the mandated low wage rates and the bans
9on local wage supplementation. With these shifts in program direction," the
perceived value of the PSE program declined rapidly to local and state
government officials. PSE had become so restrictive in both whom it served
and how it operated that it literally choked itself--politically and oper-
ationally speaking--to death. Detailed program regulation at the federal
level is not the way to run any program in a system that was founded on the
pririciple of decentralization of responsibility.
The CETA Amendments of 1978 also added specific percentage" set-asides
of PSE funds for training. The assumption was that structurally unemployed
persons were in need of job skills and that, while they were PSE workers,
some could also have these deficiencies rectified. While the diagnosis may
have been plausible, experience shows that the prescription was wrong. The
legislation specified that significant percentages of funds be spent for
training--not that any particular numbers of persons must be trained. Much
of the funds were spent on consultants, teaching materials, and "world-of-
work" orientation c"lasses. Skill training opportunities for PSE participants
were scant. The logistics of arranging training opportunities--especially
in rural areas--were often horrendous. Moreover, because the Amendments also
limited the duration of PSE eligibility to participants to 18 months, many.
employers simply could not see the utility of the training requirement. The
PSE workers hired after 1978 were largely employed in jobs that Jid not re-
quire skills. Hence, many pragmatic employers could not see the need tu
train workers to do something else or to be employed somewhere else. It would
appear that it was a mistake to have added such an amorphous training require-
ment for PSE workers. In practice, the two functions did not mix. The strong
suit of PSE is.on-the-jQb training""-not make-shift classroom instructions.
Had it not been for the mandatory diversion of substantial funds from job
~
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creation to training, more funds could have been used to hire more PSE workers.
If training was the problem, there were other CETA titles that could be used
to provide such opportunities. As a minimum, the use of some PSE funds for
training should have been at the option of the local prime sponsors. The
training mandates unnecessarily complicated the administration of an already
complex program.
Concluding Observations
During the 1970s, there were a variety of different PSE programs. There
was not a monolithic format. As could be anticipated, some phases and some
aspects of the various PSE programs were more successful than others. On
balance, the research on PSE is strongly favorable. In its countercyclical
role, PSE, was an effective instrument of fiscal policy for the nation; in
its counterstructural role, it was a benefical human resource development
program for its participants. In both capacities it contributed notably to
the futherance of equal employment opportunity objectives in the public
sector. As with any new public policy initiative, however, it did not work
perfectly. But at least its positive and negative aspects are now known.
It remains to,be demonstrated whether the chief alternative to PSE--massive
tax cutting--can accomplish as much or more. It can only be hoped that
the tax reduction program enacted for the 1980s will be put to the same
rigorous performance tests as were the PSE programs of the 1970s.
..
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